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Abstract: Several recent publications attest to a renewed interest, at the dawn 
of the 21st century, in the philosophy of Charles S. Peirce. While agreeing with 
the relevance of Peirce philosophy for the 21st century, we disagree with some 
interpretations of Peirce as a utilitarian-based pragmatist, or with attempts to 
extract from Peirce a theory of social justice for 21st century societies. A 
critical exploration of Peirce’s philosophy of science, particularly his idea 
of scientific inquiry as “the study of useless things”, serves to illuminate the 
un-pragmatic and anti-utilitarian dimension of Peirce’s thought, as well as to 
reveal his true ethical relevance for the 21st century.
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Resumo: Várias publicações recentes atestam um interesse renovado, 
no alvorecer do Século XXI, na filosofia de Charles S. Peirce. Embora 
concordando com a importância da filosofia peirciana para o Século XXI, 
discordamos com algumas interpretações de Peirce como um pragmatista 
utilitarista, ou com tentativas de extrair dele uma teoria de justiça social 
para as sociedades do Século XXI. Uma exploração crítica da filosofia da 
ciência de Peirce, particularmente sua ideia de investigação científica 
como o “estudo de coisas inúteis”, serve para iluminar a dimensão não-
pragmática e não-utilitária do pensamento peirciano, como também para 
revelar sua verdadeira relevância ética para o Século XXI.
Palavras-chave: Pragmatismo. Peirce. Utilitarismo. Investigação científica. 
Pluralismo. Ética. Ciências Sociais.
Introduction
Several recent publications attest to a renewed interest, at the dawn of the 21st 
century, in the works of 19th-century philosopher Charles S. Peirce. Some of these 
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interventions (LANE, 2007; TROUT, 2008; BERTILSSON, 2009; CANTEÑS, 2009; 
DILWORTH, 2011; BOERO, 2013; CAMPOS, 2014; HERDY, 2014), while agreeing 
on the idea that Peirce’s philosophy is relevant to contemporary philosophical 
concerns, also reveal marked disagreements over the possible applicability of Peirce 
to the social sciences, and, at a broader level, to social and ethical life in general. 
The disagreements, we will argue, emerge in the last analysis from a widespread 
confusion over Peirce’s position within the pragmatist tradition or, more specifically, 
from the common-but-erroneous tendency to associate pragmatism with the 
production of knowledge that is useful, practical, capable of offering solutions to 
problems of vital importance to human life. 
The tendency to equate pragmatism with utilitarianism, to be sure, bears its 
roots in the early origins of pragmatism, and is more prevalent in the North-American 
context, where pragmatism is often conceived as “a philosophical expression 
of the American go-getter spirit with its success oriented ideology,” and as “a 
quintessentially American philosophy” (RESCHER, 2007, p. 129); associated with 
authors like William James, John Dewey, or Richard Rorty. In Peirce’s pragmatism, 
though, the equation with utilitarianism cannot be sustained. In fact, it was in an 
attempt to clarify his position on this issue, and with the interest of establishing 
a distance between himself and the other more utilitarian-based pragmatists, that 
Peirce called his own philosophy “pragmaticism.”
A critical exploration of Peirce’s philosophy of science, particularly his idea 
of scientific inquiry as “the study of useless things” (or, as he metaphorically put it, 
the activity of “castle-building in Spain” (CP 1.76, c.1896), serves to illuminate the 
instead somewhat un-pragmatic and anti-utilitarian dimension of Peirce’s thought, as 
well as to reveal his true ethical relevance for the 21st century.
Attempting to interpret Peirce as a utilitarian pragmatist, we will finally 
argue, not only misconstrues Peirce’s philosophical ideas, but also erases with one 
stroke the basic attractiveness and relevance that his thought may have for 21st 
century philosophers. 
1 Unorthodox interpretations of Peirce’s pragmatism
In The Politics of Survival (2008), Lara Trout puts forward the idea that it is possible 
to extract from Peirce’s philosophy a method for solving disputes related to social 
injustices, particularly those committed by dominant or hegemonic groups against 
minority or subaltern groups. In a highly unorthodox and extremely utopian 
manner, Trout will claim to have devised, out of Peirce’s pragmatist philosophy, 
a method capable of producing a catharsis-like, enlightening process in the mind 
of dominant/hegemonic groups, by which they can come to recognize their own 
complicity (intentional or unintentional) in producing and perpetuating the injustice, 
and the motivation to act in ways that help reverse the injustice.  In Trout’s view, 
three critical tools devised by Peirce (i.e. scientific inquiry, agapic love and critical 
common-sensism) are capable of combining to produce, in the mind of the dominant 
or hegemonic group, an empathic understanding of the social group upon whom an 
injustice is being committed. The utopianism behind Trout’s work can be evidenced 
from the following paragraph:
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The strands of science, agape, and Critical Common-sensism 
weave into a tapestry of loving reasonableness, where the 
embrace of diverse perspectives promotes growth in knowledge 
and self-control. Thus Critical Common-sensism provides those 
in hegemonic groups with consciousness-raising tools that can 
help them address their blind spots towards discrimination 
faced by those in non-hegemonic groups. Scientific method and 
agape provide the epistemological and loving motivation to put 
this awareness into practice by resisting exclusionary instinctive 
beliefs despite how strong their influence can be. (TROUT, 2008, 
p. 229-230; our emphasis).
A comparison of Trout’s theory of social justice with that of liberal-philosopher 
John Rawls can help further illustrate the utopianism behind Trout’s proposition. In 
his A Theory of Justice (1971), Rawls explored the conditions under which rational 
individuals could consensually agree on the idea of a just society, and on a set of 
rules that should govern social relations in such society. But, fearing that unequal 
relations of power could act as an obstacle to agreement and consensus, Rawls 
was forced to devise a mechanism through which social subjects (particularly those 
belonging to hegemonic groups) can be brought to elect what is best for society as 
a whole, even when it runs against their own personal interests. Only when social 
agents are covered by “a veil of ignorance” (i.e. the ignorance of what position they 
will occupy in the society they are creating), Rawls reasoned, would they be able 
to choose rationally and justly. Trout will attempt to reach the same outcome but, 
unlike Rawls, he would fail to provide a realistic explanation—other than a utopian 
“tapestry of loving reasonableness”—of how and why social subjects in positions 
of power would act against their own best interests, or change their position 
without further justification, just like that! In other words, for Trout the emphatic 
understanding can be achieved without a veil of ignorance, and without any other 
tool to take its place. Scientific evidence, critical common-sensism and agapic love 
“alone” can achieve the desired end.  
The idea that the contemporary world urgently needs an important dose of 
common-sense and agapic love is one everyone should agree with, and we are not 
the exception. But it is the proposition that they “alone” are capable of “eliminating 
exclusionary beliefs despite how strong their influence can be” (2008, p. 230), that 
is, in our view, problematic; and problematic for naïve and utopic. What is still not 
clear, what still needs to be explained, is how and why a subject would embrace 
critical common-sensism and agapic love in the first place. The proposition, by 
the way, would also contradict empirical evidence coming from anthropology 
and sociology (not to mention the front pages of newspapers daily), that amply 
document innumerable cases of conflicts between groups, and where multiple 
calls for common-sense and empathy for the other have proven unsuccessful in 
preventing confrontation, violence and bloodshed. As these anthropologists and 
sociologists have shown, ethnocentrism, racism, ideology, prejudice, hegemony, 
discursive regimes, “banality of evil”—Peirce will add “perversity” (CP 5.408, 
1877)—are powerful forces shaping peoples beliefs and actions, and attempting to 
overcome them through calls for “loving reasonableness” would doubtingly suffice.
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Moreover, the interpretation of Peirce arrived at by Trout becomes questionable 
when one considers some controversial statements made by Peirce in extra-scientific 
contexts, and which would place him at odds with somebody holding an empathic 
and “loving-reasonable” view of minority groups. Peirce’s apology for slavery, or his 
derogatory statements produced against other cultural groups like British, Cubans 
and Spaniards, could all serve as examples. But the issue is particularly relevant 
regarding extra-academic statements made against Spaniards in the context of the 
Spanish-American War, and recovered by Jaime Nubiola in his “Peirce y España” 
(2006). In two personal letters written in 1898 (the year the war exploded), Peirce 
made some unquestionably prejudicial statements against Spaniards. In a first letter, 
written to his cousin Henry Cabot Lodge, Peirce described Spaniards as “corrupted” 
and having “little real manhood left.” (L 254, Letter from Charles S. Peirce to Henry 
Cabot Lodge, 1898; cf. Nubiola 2006: 77) Moreover, in a second letter addressed 
to his brother James, Peirce expressed his personal conviction that “the Spaniards 
blew up the Maine” although “we cannot produce a formal proof of the fact.” 
Nonetheless, Peirce concludes: “We did right in not making it a formal casus belli 
but still in going to war because of it.” (L 339, Letter from Charles S. Peirce to James 
Mills Peirce, 7 May 1898; cf. NUBIOLA, 2006: 79).
In commenting on these derogatory statements made by Peirce against 
Spaniards, David Campos has argued that they betray a contradiction in Peirce 
between what is said and what is done, and therefore, that the statements can be 
taken as evidence that Peirce “failed to live up to his own logic of inquiry.” “Even 
though no formal proof of the Spaniard’s blowing up the USS Maine existed,” says 
Campos, “Peirce found it safe… to go to war because of this hypothesis” (CAMPOS, 
2014, p. 43), or, what is the same, to “support a war on the basis of an extremely 
fallible abductive inference” (CAMPOS, 2014, p.51). In other words, rather than 
taking Peirce’s derogatory statements against Spaniards as an indication that Trout’s 
interpretation of Peirce was in need of revision, Campos instead decided—against 
what the evidence suggested—to maintain the idea of a Peircean ethics based on 
reasonable agapic love. In claiming this, our intention is not to excuse Peirce for 
his derogatory statements against Spaniards, but rather to point out, as has already 
been done by Canteñs, that “we may criticize Peirce for his prejudiced views about 
Hispanic culture, but we cannot, as Campos suggests, criticize him for contradicting 
his own philosophy.” (CANTEÑS, 2009, p. 17). Moreover, we agree with David 
Dilworth’s critique of Trout’s theory of agapic love: i.e. that it “collides head-on 
with Peirce’s objective idealism,” that is, with “his sense of truth and reality that is 
independent of you, me, or any group or epoch of social persons.” (DILWORTH, 
2011, p. 524). Thus, like Trout before him, Campos also reaches an interpretation 
of Peirce as a “vulgar” pragmatist in search for useful knowledge and social justice. 
And, as we will attempt to show, such interpretation clashes head-on with other 
(in our view, more accurate) interpretations reached by other authors, like Rachel 
Herdy (2014), Thora Margareta Bertilsson (2009) or Hedy Boero (2013).
2 Peirce’s philosophical ethics
In “The Origin and Growth of Peirce’s Ethics” (2014), Rachel Herdy has insightfully 
shown the evolution of Peirce’s views on ethics throughout his academic career, with 
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a drastic change of position occurring circa 1898—that is, precisely the year when 
the Spanish-American War began, and when Peirce wrote the two infamous letters 
making derogatory statements about Spaniards. Herdy’s periodization of Peirce’s 
ethical thinking coincides with that put forward by Boero (2013).1 Thus, for both 
these authors, in the period before 1898 Peirce sustained the position that the norms 
that govern scientific inquiry and those that govern social interaction in general, 
are contradictory between themselves, and irreconcilable. A normative ethical 
construct, because it must be capable of indicating “the right thing to do,” requires 
for its functioning a conservative and change-avoiding belief system. Science, on 
the contrary, must proceed following the pragmatic principle that “the meaning 
of reality can never be exhausted,” and that “Reason is in a continual process of 
improvement [that] never reaches its perfection once and for all.” (BOERO, 2013, p. 
32). Imposing a conservative ethics on a system requiring continual improvement 
would be counterproductive. 
The 1898 Cambridge Lectures were, according to Herdy, “the last moment 
Peirce would publicly express his disparaging attitude towards ethics” (2014, p. 
272). In his 1902 Minute Logic, and later in his 1903 Harvard Lectures, Peirce 
would evidence a drastic change of position on this issue. Contrary to what he had 
consistently held up until 1898, Peirce now reasoned that the decision to engage 
(or not to engage) in the practice of science must be, in its most seminal origins, 
an ethical decision, precisely because it is based on a deliberate action. Moreover, 
because the idea of a community (a scientific community in this case, but which is 
equally true for any other type of community) can only be sustained by reference to 
a set of agreed-upon normative ethical rules to which all its members would abide, 
this later period would then also evidence an attempt at formulating the general 
content and contours of such ethical system, in the form of what he called a “Pure 
Ethics.” But he warns that his pure ethics is not a method for devising the right thing 
to do on matters of vital importance in the here and now, but “only intended to be 
pure theory.” (CP 5.125, 1903).
Thus, in stark opposition to the views put forward by Trout and Campos, the 
writings of Bertilsson, Herdy and Boero will instead emphasize the un-pragmatic 
aspirations of Peirce’s pure ethics. Bertilsson, for example, would reach an 
understanding of Peirce’s philosophy as “utterly un-pragmatic.”
The theory of meaning of Peirce’s pragmatism is, in a very 
strong sense, a logical-normative one. As such, it frees itself 
from practical concerns of the here and now, as it was not 
meant to solve problems but to avoid pseudoproblems […] As a 
normative theory of action, as a theory of conduct and general 
praxis, pragmaticism is however an utterly ‘unpragmatic’ one. 
(BERTILSSON, 2009, p. 171).
1 We are aware there is some disagreement between scholars about the periodization 
of Peirce’s thought and, while we agree with Herdy and Boero on this issue, arguing 
the opposite would in no way invalidate the general thesis of this work, i.e. that an 
interpretation of Peirce as a “vulgar” pragmatist cannot be sustained.
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In similar fashion, Herdy will point out that Peirce’s pure ethics “had no aspiration to 
guide human conduct,” nor to answer “first-order [ethical] questions such as ‘Should I 
give famine relief?’ or ‘Should I return the wallet I found on the street?’” (HERDY, 2014, 
p. 274) If one wishes to find general rules of conduct deriving from Peirce’s pure ethics, 
it would be only and exclusively for the scientific community, or for the scientist qua 
scientist. A brief review of Peirce’s philosophy of science will help illustrate the point. 
3 Building castles in Spain
No other Peircean expression invites a more un-pragmatic and anti-utilitarian 
interpretation of his philosophy than that used by him to describe his idea of 
scientific inquiry: namely, “the study of useless things.”
True science is distinctively the study of useless things. For the 
useful things will get studied without the aid of scientific men. 
To employ these rare minds on such work is like running a 
steam engine by burning diamonds. (CP 1.76, 1896).
Two years later, in 1898, Peirce returns to the same topic:
There are sciences, of course, many of whose results are almost 
immediately applicable to human life, such as physiology and 
chemistry. But the true scientific investigator completely loses 
sight of the utility of what he is about. It never enters his mind. 
Do you think that the physiologist who cuts up a dog reflects, 
while doing so, that he may be saving a human life? Nonsense. 
If he did, it would spoil him for a scientific man; and then the 
vivisection would become a crime. However, in physiology and 
in chemistry, the man whose brain is occupied with utilities, 
though he will not do much for science, may do a great deal for 
human life. (CP 1.619, 1898).
Peirce would also produce metaphors (e.g. building castles in Spain; CP 6.48, 
1908) and provide imaginary examples (e.g. a shining rock buried in the middle 
of the ocean; CP 5.409, 1877) with the aim of illuminating the meaning behind his 
idea of “useless things.” Among other things, “useless things” makes reference to 
knowledge of things whose utility remains obscure to us at the present moment, or 
at the moment of conducting inquiry, but that could very well appear in the future. 
I must confess that it makes very little difference whether we say 
that a stone on the bottom of the ocean, in complete darkness, 
is brilliant or not—that is to say, that it probably makes no 
difference, remembering always that that stone may be fished 
up tomorrow. (CP 5.409, 1877).
A more factual example of this phenomenon would be the compass, whose history 
captured Peirce’s attention for the fact that it was not implemented or regularly 
employed until almost two hundred years after its invention (CN 2, 122, 1896). Like 
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the stone on the bottom of the ocean, the compass had to wait around two centuries 
before its utility could be figured out.
But the idea of “useless things” acquires a truer, deeper meaning when one 
considers that, within Peirce’s pragmatism, utility can never be used as an adequate 
measure of the truthfulness and veracity of a scientific proposition, because it is 
perfectly possible for a scientific theory to be useful yet plainly wrong. Guaranteeing 
the continuity of “true science” requires the existence of a scientific community and 
of scientific institutions capable of entertaining in a freely and unrestricted manner 
idealistic and hypothetical constructions of reality, most of which have no known 
useful application, and even under the awareness that empirical proofs of their 
truthfulness are close to impossible (if not altogether impossible) to reproduce in 
experimental settings, or by any other means. In a scientific enterprise interested 
more in truth than utility, scientific theories are best conceived as “castles built in 
Spain” (or “castles built in the air” if one wishes to use the English variant of this 
originally French phrase), than as fixed and corroborated knowledge systems.
In claiming this, Peirce is not suggesting that “building castles in the air” is 
a sufficient cause for scientific discovery, but merely a necessary one. To claim 
that scientific inquiry and discovery is always preceded by “castle-building in 
the air” is different from claiming that all “castle-building in the air” will result in 
scientific discovery:
People who build castles in the air do not, for the most part, 
accomplish much, it is true; but every man who does accomplish 
great things is given to building elaborate castles in the air and 
then painfully copying them on solid ground. Indeed, the whole 
business of ratiocination, and all that makes us intellectual 
beings, is performed in imagination. (CP 6.286, 1893).
Now, if “truly” pragmatic scientific inquiry is “the study of useless things,” several 
conclusions must follow about the proper ethical conduct of the scientist qua 
scientist. The first one, and the most evident, is that knowledge of the utility of 
something (or more specifically, the lack of it) cannot be used as criteria in deciding 
whether an inquiry on that something should or should not be carried out, or 
whether funds should or should not be granted to it. 
Sure enough, Peirce’s “truly” pragmatist science would be at odds with many 
of the forms that characterize the way science is practiced in the Western World 
today. As Winner has suggested, perhaps the thing that makes Peirce so attractive 
to 21st century philosophers, insofar as his philosophy of science is concerned, is 
precisely the relevance that his work acquires within the debate over the institutional 
mechanisms through which funding for scientific inquiry is assigned; dominated as 
it is by a culture of assessment and the pressure to meet the demands for instant 
gratification. In Winner’s view, Peirce’s philosophy of science serves as: 
[…] a wonderful weapon against those academic and political 
bureaucrats, scientistic positivists and pragmatist in the vulgar 
and not Peircean sense of the word who see value only in those 
scientific projects that “pay off”! (WINNER, 1994, p. 289).
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4 Futuristic and evolutionary dimensions of Peirce’s philosophy
If, within Peirce’s philosophy of science, the scientists must engage in scientific 
inquiry without taking into consideration the possible uses his or her discoveries 
may have in terms of satisfying vital human interests or needs, it then follows that 
the ethics of the scientific community is an altruistic ethics; that is, in the sense 
that the researcher will most probably not benefit directly, during his lifetime, from 
the possible advantages that could be derived from his scientific discovery. There 
is, thus, a future-oriented dimension of Peirce’s thought without which his ethical 
thinking becomes unintelligible—that is, in the sense that the ultimate beneficiaries 
of a scientific discovery are always located in the future, and probably generations 
apart from the discoverer’s lifetime. In fact, this future-oriented dimension permeates 
over almost every aspect of his philosophical work. It will feature prominently in his 
theory of the three categories, and in the names he chose to give them: Firstness, 
Secondness and Thirdness. His whole philosophy is crossed by the fundamental 
presupposition that there is a temporal movement of human progress speared into 
the future, and was convinced that scientific knowledge would someday transform 
human society. As Bertilsson has put it, Peirce “nourished a hope that logic and 
science could teach men and women to see ‘particulars’ from the point of view of a 
universal community of observers.” (BERTILSSON, 2009, p. 199).
But it is the futuristic dimension of his philosophy, its “speculative” character, 
its insertion within an evolutionary cosmology, what makes Peirce’s thought on 
ethics somewhat unique within the pragmatist tradition. On occasions, Peirce will 
even suggest the need for a “speciation” process to take place before the desired 
impact of science on society. In a passage where Peirce reflects on the ill-fated 
possibility of having a scientific proposition accepted by a universal community of 
observers, Peirce wrote:  
Our perversity and that of others may indefinitely postpone 
the settlement of opinion; it might even conceivably cause an 
arbitrary [erroneous] proposition to be universally accepted 
as long as the human race should last. Yet even that would 
not change the nature of the belief, which alone could be the 
result of investigation carried sufficiently far; and if, after the 
extinction of our race, another should arise with faculties and 
dispositions for investigation, that true opinion must be the one 
which they would ultimately come to. ‘Truth crushed to earth 
shall rise again.’ (CP 5.408, 1877).
In Peirce, how the world ought to be and how it will be like in the long-term future are 
merged: they are the same thing. And the scientific community is a micro-cosmos of 
what society at large will look like in the future. It was based on this idea that Winner 
(1994) would establish an analogy between Peirce’s philosophical futurism and 
George Orwell’s 1984 novel; that is, given the prophetic or predictive character of 
both works (although each arriving at different, perhaps opposite, social formations). 
Perhaps it would be safe to say that Trout and Campos were right in recognizing 
the ethical implications for life that are derived from Peirce’s philosophy, but without 
realizing the long-term temporal framework within which Peirce was working, and 
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which all “vulgar” interpretations of Peirce’s pragmatism fail to recognize. Trout and 
Campos pretend to extract out of Peirce’s philosophy something which in Peirce is 
only present in the form of a futuristic projection, whose specific contours he (and 
we as well) are not yet able to see with absolute clarity, but simply speculate on. 
Elam and Bertilsson (2003) have given us an idea of how that future society, as 
envisioned by Peirce, would look like: one characterized by the appearance of a 
new man, the “scientific citizen.” 
Conclusion
While Peirce’s early works show a disparaging attitude towards ethics, his position 
on ethics changed drastically in the period 1898 and afterwards. It was only in 
this mature period when Peirce attempted to develop a philosophical ethics, 
and then only in the form of a “pure” ethics: that is, an ethics interested more in 
understanding the world as it ought to be (or could be in a future evolutionary stage 
of development) than as it is right now.
Nonetheless, important ethical implications are derived from gaining, as 
Peirce does, critical awareness of our current position in the chain of progress and 
evolution. In this sense, Peirce’s pragmatism serves to warn us of the dangers that 
lay behind dogmatism, behind theories that promise to bring knowledge to a full 
closure, or behind the utopia of fixed meanings—in Wartenberg’s terms, behind 
“illusionary feelings of harmonic oneness.” (BERTILSSON, 2009, p. 173). In Peirce’s 
pragmatism, reason is plural (at least in its current evolutionary stage), and any 
attempt to reduce Reason to any of its particular manifestations can be taken as 
inflicting violence upon such plurality.2
But, for anyone wishing to extract from pragmatism a theory of social justice, 
or to show what is “the right thing to do” on issues of vital importance to social and 
political life (e.g., Should I return the wallet I found on the street? Should the US 
declare war to Spain?), Peirce’s pragmatism will be of little help.  To be sure, other 
utilitarian pragmatist philosophers would have lent themselves more suitable for 
the task: e.g. William James, John Dewey or Richard Rorty. But, what makes Peirce 
unique, what makes him different from these other more utilitarian-based pragmatist 
philosophers, is also, and precisely, what makes him a 19th-century philosopher for 
the 21st century. (cf. DEBROCK, 1992).
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